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PROTECTING FAIR USE WITH FOGERTY: TOWARD A NEW
DUAL STANDARD
John A. Fonstad*
Copyright law exists to promote the progress of art and science. It achieves this by
balancing limited grants of rights to authors against public access to works. How-
ever, copyright holders have upset this balance and tilted the law in their favor
One cause of this phenomenon is that the benefit of public access to works is dif-
fused throughout the entire public while the benefit of rights in works is
concentrated in the copyright holder. This problem is especially prevalent in the
context of litigation where copyright holders (plaintiffs) often stand to gain more
through victory than copyright users (defendants). As a result of imbalanced liti-
gation incentives, the fair use doctrine, a doctrine meant to preserve the balance of
copyright law that relies on litigation for its development and efficacy, is often ren-
dered nugatory despite the merits of the defendant's case. This Note contends that
the current implementation of the Copyright Act's version of attorney fee shifting
does not solve this problem and, in many cases, actually compounds it. This Note
also argues for a new interpretation of the Supreme Court's mandate of "even-
handed" treatment of copyright plaintiffs' and defendants' fee petitions.
Rebalancing litigation incentives would restore fair use and refocus copyright law
on the promotion of progress.
[Flair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to de-
fend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system for
defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad-in practically
every context, but especially here.
-Lawrence Lessig'
INTRODUCTION
Lawrence Lessig termed the Constitution's Intellectual Property
Clause 2 the "Progress Clause" because the command "to promote
progress" circumscribes Congress's legislative jurisdictions Grants
of intellectual property rights, such as copyrights, exist to benefit
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2007; University of Wisconsin-
Stout, B.S. 2004. Thank you to Professor Susan Kornfield whose teaching inspired this Note.
1. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004).
2. The clause provides: "The Congress shall have power: ... To promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 130-31; see also L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W.
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 135 (1991).
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the public good.4 Copyright owners' private rights are merely the
means of promoting the progress of science and art. Copyright law
facilitates an exchange: an author provides the public with a crea-
tive contribution and receives temporary rights in his work .
However sensible a concept, implementing the quid pro quo be-
tween public and private rights is often confounding. Recent
projects that utilize copyrighted material, such as Google's Book
Search," demonstrate that copyright holders and users often dis-
agree about what constitutes the proper balance of exchange .7
The exact allocation of rights to copyright holders and users that
will maximize creative progress is unknown. Copyright holders and
copyright users invariably bemoan the current state of the law as
being too favorable to the other side.8 However, the consensus view
is that copyright holders have used legislation and litigation to ex-
pand their rights beyond a level that most efficiently promotes
9
progress.
4. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 261 (James Madison) (Bantam Dell 2003).
Both England's Statute of Anne, the model used by America, and the Copyright Act of 1790
began: "An Act for the encouragement of learning. ." Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19
(Eng.); Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124. The Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed this purpose. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) ("'The copyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.'"
(quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948))).
5. See, e.g., EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 13-17 (2000).
The primary rights of copyright owners are listed in 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2006).
6. Google Book Search is a collaborative project between Google and large libraries
to digitize books both in and out of copyright. See generally What is Google Book Search?,
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/about.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2007) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Each scanned book is placed in
Google's Internet-searchable database. Id. Google claims that this is a fair use of works in
copyright because users who search the database are only allowed to see a small portion of
any copyrighted work. Id. The American Association of Publishers and the Authors Guild
have filed suit against Google, alleging massive copyright infringement. Id. A number of
Google's recent projects have been near the boundaries of copyright law. See Kevin J. Delany
& Brooks Barnes, Image Control: For Soaring Google, Next Act Won't Be as Easy as the First, WALL
ST.J.,June 30, 2005, at Al.
7. See generally Remarks at the New York Public Library Celeste Bartos Forum entitled
"The Battle Over Books: Authors and Publishers Take on the Google Print Library Project"
(Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.nypl.org/research/calendar/imagesprog/
google 1 1705.pdf [hereinafter New York Public Library Forum].
8. Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Law Got a Bad Name for Itself 26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 61, 61-62 (2002) ("I can summarize it in one word: Greed."). All people and corpora-
tions both own copyrights and use material copyrighted by others. However, some rely on
copyright ownership to generate profits more than others. While copyright users normally
have interests that align with the most expansive interpretation of the public domain, their
interests can diverge. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
9. See infra Part I. Of course, this does not prove that copyright law is now "unbal-
anced." It is possible that copyright law previously was "unbalanced" in favor of the public
domain and, thus, recent shifts might merely reflect a rebalancing. Moreover, the status quo
is always technically "balanced" because Congress and the courts define the baseline of bal-
[VOL. 40:3
Protecting Fair Use
While the notion of a constitutional balance to optimize pro-
gress is abstract,' its implementation within subtopics of copyright
law has important implications for the development of the law and
creative works. This Note will address the balance of public and
private rights embodied in copyright's fair use doctrine. "Fair use"
limits copyright holders' rights by permitting certain acts of copy-
ing copyrighted material." The scope of fair use protection varies
according to the purpose of the copying, the amount copied, the
nature of the copyrighted work, and the effect the use of the cop-
ied material will have on the market for the copyrighted work.
2
Due to copyright holders' gains in other aspects of copyright law,
greater emphasis has been placed on fair use's ability to preserve
the public domain." However, fair use is a "fuzzy' 4 topic that, de-
spite its codification in 17 U.S.C. § 107, relies heavily on the
judiciary to "fill in the substantial gaps"'5 in the doctrine.
Litigation plays an important role in defining and maintaining
the balance of rights in copyright law. Depending on the facts of a
lawsuit, a victorious copyright plaintiff or defendant" could ad-
vance the paramount interest of promoting progress. 7 Litigation is
ancing whenever they act within the broad scope of the Intellectual Property Clause. How-
ever, as Part I demonstrates, copyright holders benefit from process-based advantages.
10. See, e.g.,JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 6
(2002) ("Simply pointing to the constitutional language, however, masks the complexity
.... .).
11. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107 (2006); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural
Analysis of Copyrights Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 382, 408
(2005) (discussing fair use as a means for balancing private rights and public access); see
generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2006)
(examining fair use).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (laying out these four factors).
13. The public domain represents the realm of free legal uses of another person's
work. See infra text accompanying notes 64-70. In the context of computers and electronic
copies, Lessig writes, "those who would defend the unregulated use of copyrighted work
must look exclusively to ... fair use[], to bear the burden of this shift." LESSIG, supra note 1,
at 143.
14. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 292.
15. Sag, supra note 11, at 419. While fair use was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976,
this action merely gave the common law tradition of fair use Congress's imprimatur. H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. Sag continues by
compiling and suggesting ways in which judges can craft the doctrine of fair use. Sag, supra
note 11, at 419-35. Suggestions for the judicial improvement of fair use assume the prereq-
uisite of an effective adversarial system.
16. While both plaintiffs and defendants can assert copyright claims, see, e.g., Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994), for the purposes of this Note "plaintiff' refers to a
copyright owner and "defendant" to an alleged infringer.
17. The promotion of progress requires a balanced mix of public and private rights. If
copyright defendants win too often, progress would not be promoted because authors would
lose an incentive to create works. If copyright plaintiffs win too often, progress wotld not be
promoted because the public's right to access works would be unduly impaired. See, e.g.,
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especially important in the context of fair use because the doctrine
contemplates a large role for the courts."' The judicial resolution of
disputes can both clarify legal issues within copyright law and lead
to evolutions in the law. "The process of demarcation occurs, in
most cases, only through repeated litigation of difficult issues."' 9 If
litigation is to play a role in defining fair use, plaintiffs and defen-
dants must have "the will to litigate., 20  Copyright holders
(plaintiffs) and users (defendants) must have an equally vigorous
incentive and desire to litigate or else copyright law will tilt in favor
of the side most vigorously litigating.2'
In order to encourage both copyright holders and copyright us-
ers to vigorously defend their relative positions, Congress enacted
§ 505 of the Copyright Act.2 2 Section 505 allows a discretionary
award of fees, including attorney's fees, to the prevailing party in a
copyright suit.23 Lower court interpretations of § 505 have varied:
some circuits provided prevailing plaintiffs and defendants equal
access to a fee award, while other circuits provided an easy means
for plaintiffs to recover, but a heightened standard for defen-
dants. 24 In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court ruled that
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants must be accorded "even-
handed" consideration of petitions for attorney's fees.26 Rejecting
the alternate "dual" standard, which encouraged awarding fees to
prevailing plaintiffs, but discouraged them for prevailing defen-
dants, the Court explained, "[D]efendants who seek to advance a
variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to
litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to
White v. SamsungElecs. Am., Inc., 989 E2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,J., dissenting
from denial of a motion for rehearing en banc) ("Overprotecting intellectual property is as
harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain."); WIL-
LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 20-21, 73-76 (2003).
18. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 11, at 410-11.
19. Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That-The Defendant's Dilemma, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 112 (1992) (published before Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)); accord John
Shelton Lawrence & Bernard Timberg, Conclusions: Scholars, Media, and the Law in the 1990s,
in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 364, 370 (John Shelton Lawrence & Bernard Timberg eds.,
2d ed. 1989) (arguing that copyright users should actively litigate to establish and defend
their rights).
20. Jaszi, supra note 19, at 114.
21. Lawrence & Timberg, supra note 19, at 370 (arguing that uneven litigation incen-
tives could help shape the evolution of the law).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 101-123.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 113-121.
25. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
26. Id. at 520-21.
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litigate meritorious claims of infringement. 2 7 However, despite
Fogerty's potential to ensure evenhanded awards of attorney's fees,
many commentators have suggested that the judicial application of
§ 505 after Fogerty has scarcely changed .
This Note extends the criticisms regarding the implementation
of § 505 to the specific context of fair use and proposes an alter-
nate interpretation of the Fogerty standard in fair use cases that
would encourage fair use defenses. Part I recounts the origins of
the copyright imbalance and the inherent advantages of copyright
holders that threaten the constitutional purpose of copyright law
and chip away at doctrines that protect the public domain. Part II
addresses fair use's practical inability to protect the public's right
of access to copyrighted materials and to correct imbalances be-
tween copyright holders' and users' rights. Part III demonstrates
that the current interpretation of Fogerty and copyright's fee shift-
ing statute fails to encourage the assertion of meritorious fair use
defenses. Finally, Part IV proposes a new standard that courts
should apply in assessing the petitions for attorney's fees in fair use
cases. The proposed standard better achieves the Supreme Court's
mandate of evenhandedness by promoting evenhanded incentives
for litigation, rather than merely equal opportunities for an award
of attorney's fees.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE COPYRIGHT IMBALANCE
Because the existence or non-existence of intellectual property
rights represents a zero-sum game situation, the balance between
the rights of copyright holders and copyright users is under con-
stant pressure. When one side gains an edge in political clout, legal
doctrines, or new technology, the balance necessarily shifts. In re-
cent years, many commentators have argued that the balance in
copyright law has been tilting in favor of copyright holders.29 While
recent legislation most clearly reflects this shift, litigation is equally
responsible. As the public domain becomes more constricted, fair
27. Id. at 527.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 406; LESSIG, supra note 1, at xv-xvi
(suggesting that copyright law is becoming "feudal"); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
14 (2001); SIvA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: TIE RISE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 80 (2001); James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33,
37 (2003) (asserting that "[w]e are in the middle of a second enclosure movement"); Robert
S. Boynton, The 7yranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 25, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 40.
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use is gaining increasing emphasis as a defense in litigation. ° How-
ever, the ability to assert a fair use defense is also a target of
copyright holders in litigation and legislation.31
The copyright market itself gives copyright holders a legislative
and litigious advantage. Because five corporations control eighty-
five percent of media sources, copyright ownership is highly
concentrated.32 While copyright holders are also copyright users,
the large number of valuable copyrights held by each entity en-
courages them to push for greater rights. Due to the size of their
collections of copyrights, large copyright holders have an incentive
to lobby and litigate because even small expected returns for any
individual copyright can be aggregated into large profits.
The efforts of large copyright holders to expand their rights in
valuable works further constricts the public domain by expanding
the rights of all copyright holders and restricting access to less
valuable copyrights. Rules and judicial decisions made in response
to the arguments of large copyright holders-who are focused on
protecting their valuable copyrights-equally apply to all copy-
righted works. 4 Thus, doctrines protective of valuable copyrights
also protect valueless copyrights, which constricts the public do-
main by denying copyright users access to copyrights that are
35nearly devoid of value to the owner.
Similarly, small copyright holders, who otherwise could not af-
ford to invest in lobbying and litigation, benefit from the lobbying
and litigation of large copyright holders.36 This expansion of rights
constricts public access to copyrighted works in two ways. First, the
expansion of rights creates a windfall for all copyright holders in
licensing negotiations. Copyright holders can demand licenses
more frequently due to the expanded scope of their rights and at
30. See generally Sag, supra note 11, at 382-83, 435.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71 (legislation) and notes 77-99 (litigation).
32. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 161-63; see also DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM HOYNES, THE
BUSINESS OF MEDIA: CORPORATE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 108-10 (2d ed. 2006).
Large copyright holders have garnered much of the annual revenue derived from copyrights
for a long time. See, e.g., William M. Blaisdell, Size of the Copyright Industries, in SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY No. 2, 21, 32-35 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter Copy-
RIGHT LAW REVISION].
33. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 216-18; see also Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 61-62. There has
been increasing stress on profiting from intellectual property assets. See SETH SHULMAN,
OWNING THE FUTURE 3, 15 (1999) (stating that we are in a "gold rush on knowledge as-
sets"). While altruism is not expected, copyright holders' efforts to enhance their rights
contribute to the imbalance in copyright law.
34. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 3, at 240.
35. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 221; LESSIG, supra note 1, at 221-22.
36. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 221.
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higher rates due to their greater rights. Second, because the iden-
tity of many small copyright holders is unknown (creating the
"orphan works" problem) , greater rights make it more difficult
for a copyright user to use an orphaned work. Because large copy-
right holders have expanded the rights of all copyright holders, a
copyright user can never be certain that a small copyright holder
or a holder of a valueless copyright would neither notice any in-
fringement nor litigate fair use. The potential user may be
deterred from an arguably fair use of the copyrighted material .
While the incentive for concentrated copyright holders to ag-
gressively expand their rights contributes to the imbalance of
rights in copyright law, the disincentives for copyright users to push
back exacerbates the imbalance. Relative to large copyright hold-
ers, copyright users, as beneficiaries of the public domain, suffer
from a public goods problem.39 Individual members of the general
public receive negligible benefits from an expanded public do-
main.0 Even if the aggregate benefit to the public domain exceeds
the cost of lobbying or litigation, the public domain normally lacks
an advocate because no discrete group of copyright users could
capture enough of the gains to justify their expenditures in de-
fense of the public domain. 4' The public goods problem has been
discussed in the context of other intellectual property rights, in-
cluding patent infringement litigation.
37. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 15-17 (2006),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. While the Copyright
Office acknowledges that the orphan works problem constricts fair use, it suggests that users
should not be deterred if a use is clearly fair. See id. at 55-56. However, this flies in the face of
reality. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 1, at 98-99.
38. Most obvious is the large potential for statutory damages associated with a copy-
right infringement action. See infra text accompanying note 94.
39. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the
Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 741, 786-87 (2001); Frank Pasquale, 7oward
an Ecology of Intellectual Property: Lessons from Environmental Economics for Valuing Copyright's
Commons, 8 YALEJ.L. & TECH. 78, 81-82 (2006).
40. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 407-09 (discussing the "asymmetry of
stakes between originators and copiers of intellectual property").
41. In a related context, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) filed
suits against individual file sharers recognizing that most defendants would gladly settle to
avoid expensive litigation. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Music Piracy Defendants in RIAA Cases Starting
to Fight Back, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 10, 2005, at 1, 17. If the RIAA's suits were of more questionable
merit, this public goods problem would clearly exist. While not using the language of public
goods, copyright scholars have long recognized this problem in copyright litigation. ARTHUR
W. WELL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 530-31 (1917) (justifying attorney's fees awards to
prevailing defendants).
42. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for De-
feating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 671-75 (2004) (explaining the incentive patent
infringement defendants with meritorious defenses have to prematurely settle cases).
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The value of the public domain is only (reluctantly) defended
when a copyright user is planning to economically exploit pro-
tected works or is being sued. 3 When the benefits resulting from
support of the public domain align with the interests of a copyright
user, the public domain gains an advocate. For example, "the bur-
den of advocacy has often fallen on libraries or universities"
because, much like large copyright holders, they stand to receive a
large enough benefit to justify such advocacy.44 Google's Book
Search has created a buzz, in part, because it is anomalous for a
large company's interests to align with fair use and the public do-
main.45 However, the interests of these entities are not aligned with
the interests of the public domain to the extent that gains to librar-
46ies or Google are separable from gains to the public domain.
When the private interests of copyright users diverge from their
alliance of convenience with the public domain, the public domain
loses its advocate 7
Copyright holders can take advantage of the public goods prob-
lem in their litigation strategies by offering to settle suits they bring
against powerful copyright users. By settling cases against wealthy
defendants, such as Google (of course, to date this has not oc-
curred in the Google case), copyright holders avoid a potential loss
that could create precedent for smaller users who would not oth-
erwise be able to afford a defense. This fear was expressed by
Lawrence Lessig regarding the suit against Google's Book Search:
43. Defendants do not go to court to defend the public domain. Rather, they litigate to
defend their own copying. The rights that they assert, however, may also support the public
domain. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 408 (distinguishing private value,
public domain value, and social value).
44. COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMMS. BD., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA
71 (2000).
45. John N. Berry III, Editorial, Big Bucks for Fair Use: A New Balance of Power in the Copy-
right Arena, LIBR.J., Oct. 15, 2005, at 8 (commenting that it was a "shocker" to find Google, a
corporation, "putting money behind less restrictive copyright law and a broader application
of the fair use clause").
46. For example, divergence occurs when the copyright holder is willing to grant an
exception, such as a license, to the individual copyright user at a rate below the expected
cost of litigation. This locally conferred right benefits the party obtaining the license, but
does not contribute to public access or the public domain. See infra text accompanying notes
47-48.
47. See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 29, at 25, 37 (demonstrating, by discussing the process
of creating new legislation, that even libraries do not always represent the public domain).
The potential for this divergence is one of the arguments copyright holders proffer when
explaining their suit against Google. See, e.g., Allan Adler, Vice President for Legal and Gov-
ernmental Affairs at the American Association of Publishers, Remarks at the New York
Public Library Forum, supra note 7, at 4.
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I'm most worried that you guys [the plaintiffs] will settle with
this rich company [Google], you'll settle. And what that will
mean is that people who are not rich, libraries or universities
or other people who want to engage in the same kind of free-
dom to copy and build indexes in the same way can't, because
you've imposed a tax on this particular kind of use. 8
By offering to settle cases against equally well-funded defendants,
copyright holders create a divergence between the interests of such
defendants and the public domain and eliminate powerful de-
fenders of the public domain.
Copyright holders also benefit from inherent rhetorical advan-
tages in the political arena. In any political debate, the side that
frames the public discourse is well-situated to influence future
policies. 9 The benefit to copyright holders from expanded copy-
right protections is easier to articulate than the abstract benefits of
expanding the public domain. ° Copyright holders have pressed
this advantage by characterizing the public access component of
copyright's balance as an issue of "piracy" versus "property. 5' The
piracy-property dichotomy draws comparisons between intellectual
property rights and normal property rights. Copyright holders
have been largely successful in their effort to frame the issue in this
manner.5 2 Because the familiar concept of property ownership is
accessible to people with no claim to legal knowledge, claims of
ownership by copyright holders are easily understood by
48. Lawrence Lessig, Remarks at the New York Public Library Forum, supra note 7, at
10. In situations where there is a large potential defendant, copyright plaintiffs may avoid
initiating a suit if they fear they might lose. See KENNETH D. CREWS, COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE,
AND THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIVERSITIES 117 (1993).
49. LITMAN, supra note 29, at 24; cf. David E. Sanger & Eric Lichtblau, Domestic Surveil-
lance: The Issues; Administration Starts Weeklong Blitz in Defense of Eavesdropping Program, N.Y.
TIMES,Jan. 24, 2006, at A18 (discussing President Bush's efforts to retitle the National Secu-
rity Administration's "domestic spying" the "terrorist surveillance program").
50. See Editorial, Keeping Copyright in Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1998, at A1O ("What
vexes any discussion of copyright is the idea of benefit. It is easy to see what the Disney Cor-
poration will lose when Mickey Mouse goes out of copyright, as he will within a few years. It
is harder to specify what the public will lose if Mickey Mouse does not go out of copyright.
The tendency, when thinking about copyright, is to vest the notion of creativity in the own-
ers of copyright."); see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use
in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 53-56 (1997) (criticizing the
market failure approach to fair use).
51. LITMAN, supra note 29, at 84-86; see also LESSIG, supra note 1, at 9-10, 66 (arguing
that the rhetoric errs when it lumps all forms of "piracy" together); Ginsburg, supra note 8,
at 63-64 (describing much of the rhetoric on both sides as "linguistic humbug").
52. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 183-84. But see Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 64.
SPRING 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
non-specialists.53 By contrast, arguments in support of the public
domain and against the conflation of normal and intellectual
property rights require a greater appreciation for the Intellectual
Property Clause's intended purpose, making such arguments
harder to advance in the public sphere.54 This rhetorical problem,
and its attendant claims of "piracy," also exists in the context of fair
use.55 In a forum at the New York Public Library discussing
Google's Book Search, David Drummond, General Counsel of
Google, stated, "I think if you hear some of these arguments, you
believe that there's no such thing as a fair use .... 56
Copyright holders' control of the public discourse not only
benefits their legislative efforts, but also impacts the judicial proc-
ess. Judges are not insulated from the public debate over
copyright's balance and fair use.57 There is substantial evidence
that judges and commentators have been increasingly adopting, or
simply assuming, copyright holders' rhetorical framework:-" Ac-
cordingly, copyright holders gain the advantage of judicial
sympathy based on their public rhetoric.
Copyright holders' legal and policy arguments benefit from the
historical inertia of legal fictions that underlie copyright law. Over
time, the protections of copyright law have gradually expanded
from the constitution's narrow command protecting "actual au-
thors and genuine writings."5 9 These historical expansions have
increasingly strayed from copyright's constitutional focus on pro-
53. See, e.g., Google's Book Search Tool (Nat'l Pub. Radio Broadcast Nov. 20, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5020954 (NPR's "The
Ethicist," Randy Cohen, acknowledging a lack of legal knowledge, but endorsing the real
property-based "piracy" rhetoric); see also LESSIG, supra note 1, at 79, 117-18; LITMAN, Supra
note 29, at 133.
54. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1037 (2005). For additional discussion, see supra note 53 and infra text accompa-
nying notes 59-62.
55. See LITMAN, supra note 29, at 83-85.
56. David Drummond, Vice President and General Counsel of Google, Inc., Remarks
at the New York Public Library Forum, supra note 7, at 5. Later in the discussion, Lawrence
Lessig challenged Allan Adler, a representative of the Association of American Publishers,
about clear falsehoods ("rhetoric") being employed. See id. at 6, 17. Fair use has become a
target in order to justify constricted interpretations of the doctrine. See LITMAN, supra note
29, at 83-85, 132.
57. See Lemley, supra note 54, at 1033-34.
58. See id. at 1033-46 ("The temptation to move from rhetoric to rationale seems al-
most irresistible."); cf Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform's Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 835, 837 & nn.9-10 (2002) (arguing that the rhetoric associated with the tort
reform movement has biased judges and juries in favor of defendants).
59. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 3, at 135-38 (describing the gradual evolution
of the words "author" and "writing"); accord Boyle, supra note 29, at 50.
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moting progressf This expansion has bolstered two misconcep-
tions about copyright law that justify copyright holders' current
rhetoric. First, it enhances the credibility of arguments that substi-
tute the Intellectual Property Clause's means for its goal by
suggesting that copyrights exist to benefit authors." Second, it fuels
erroneous comparisons between intellectual property and private
property.2 These mutually reinforcing misconceptions "can be
used as premises to generate and regenerate other copyright falla-
cies.,
63
Copyright holders' successful dominance of the public con-
sciousness64 has resulted in recent legislation that both forces the
public domain to rely more heavily on fair use and potentially lim-
its the scope of fair use. For example, after "an intense lobbying
campaign by rightsholders,"6 5 Congress increased the duration of
copyright terms, making them, on average, three times longer to-
day than they were thirty years ago.66 Apart from straining the
credibility of copyright's quid pro quo,G7 this legislation has a direct
impact on fair use because it delays the entry of works into the
public domain and requires copyright users wishing to use an old,
copyrighted work to either purchase a license, rely on fair use as a
defense to infringement, or not use it.3 Another example of copy-
right holder-friendly legislation is the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) .6 The DMCA restricts user circumvention
of technological protections that limit the use of copyrighted
works, and thus has a direct impact on fair uses of such works
60. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts: The
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 81 (2002) ("There has been a steady and ever
increasing tendency of both Congress and the judiciary to erode through legal fiction and
evermore expansive interpretation those limitations on the copyright power found in the
Clause."); see also LITMAN, supra note 29, at 86.
61. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 3, at 139-40.
62. Id. at 140-41.
63. Id. at 141-43.
64. See, e.g., Richard B. Graves Il, Private Rights, Public Uses, and the Future of the Copy-
right Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 64, 65-66 (2001) (suggesting that "Congress's most recent
copyright legislation is inconsistent with the Copyright Clause").
65. Id. at 93.
66. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 134-35.
67. Id. at 220 (noting that creators of works under the prior incentive system which
provided a shorter duration already received "the benefit of the bargain"); Graves, supra
note 64, at 99-100. But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (finding the Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998 constitutional).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
69. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see generally 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12A.02 (discussing various aspects of the DMCA).
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because copyright protection devices "deny fair use and infringe-
ment equally."70 Many other legislative gains for copyright holders
have been documented.'
Because of the imbalanced incentives for copyright holders and
users to lobby and litigate, the difficulty of finding an advocate for
the public domain, and inherent advantages in framing the public
discourse, copyright holders have been able to turn process-based
imbalances into substantive gains. While one result of these gains is
an attack on fair use, fair use as a doctrine is an especially timely
tool for restoring the balance envisioned by the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause because it represents an attempt to "strike a balance"
between the competing interests in copyright law.72 However, as the
next Part demonstrates, despite the greater need for a vibrant fair
use doctrine, the current judicial implementation of the fair use
doctrine is ill-suited to righting the imbalances discussed in this
Part.
II. THE INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF FAIR USE
Despite copyright holders' recent gains and advantages, fair use
is intended to check rightsholders' overreaching.73 Fair use exists to
preserve copyright's balance and to promote the public good.4
The fair use doctrine is codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act, but
"[s] tructurally, fair use transfers significant policy making respon-
sibility to the judiciary. 75 Thus, fair use relies on the judicial
process for its application and development. Of course, for the ju-
diciary to fulfill its role, it must hear cases. As a result, the doctrine
of fair use, and its potential for restoring some of the balance in
70. Graves, supra note 64, at 97; accord PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 170-71 (rev. ed. 2003). Copyright holders have
actively sought enforcement of DMCA provisions. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Caught by the Act:
Digital Copyright Law Ensnaing Businesses, Individuals over Fair Use, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2003,
at El.
71. See generally LESSIG, supra note 1, at 130-73; LITMAN, supra note 29, at 14 n.1. In-
deed, the legislative process for creating copyright bills, which often involves bringing
stakeholders to a negotiating table, has been criticized for inadequately representing the
public domain. See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 29, at 23; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at 7.
72. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984)
(Blackmun,J., dissenting).
73. See Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 67; see also KEITH AOKI ET AL., BOUND BY LAW? 59
(2006) ("To preserve the system, we have to preserve fair use.").
74. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-77 (1994); Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549-50 & n.3 (1985); PAITERSON &
LINDBERG, supra note 3, at 196.
75. Sag, supra note 11, at 410; see also id. at 396, 401-02 (explaining that fair use lets
Congress delegate a number of difficult policy questions to the courts).
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copyright law, is often impaired by the costs and uncertainties at-
tendant with the real-world utilization of the defense in copyright
litigation.
In theory, fair use has great potential for preserving the public
domain and the balance in copyright law. A fair use-type of doc-
trine has existed throughout much of the history of copyright law.76
While the judicial application of fair use has been criticized for
77 7
seeming to be outcome determinative or unduly cramped, many
scholars have suggested ways for improving the doctrine's applica-
tion.75 An increased judicial focus on fair use, compelled by an
increase in meritorious fair use litigation, would likely result in the
creation of a more robust doctrine .
In practice, litigation costs often make the pursuit of a fair use
defense untenable. Because fair use is a fuzzy, fact-sensitive doc-
trine and fair use arguments take a long time to craft, asserting a
fair use defense results in many billable hours of work by expensive
lawyers."' Rarely do the monetary benefits of arguing and winning a• . , 82 1
fair use case outweigh attorney's fees. Copyright plaintiffs use the
costliness of fair use defenses to their strategic advantage in litiga-
tion. If a copyright plaintiff has more resources than a copyright
defendant, the plaintiff can risk a suit even if the defendant has a
probable fair use defense, knowing that asserting the defense
would force the defendant to spend a great deal of money to liti-
gate-possibly more money than the defendant stands to gain by
the supposed fair use. As alternatives to costly litigation, a defen-
dant could settle the suit, purchase a license, or avoid a potential
suit altogether by refraining from using anything that would rely
on fair use for its legality, but each of these alternatives effectively
renders the existence of fair use nugatory. This results in a "situa-
tion opposed to justice. 83
76. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-77 (discussing the history of fair use). The first American
case to consider the doctrine was Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901). See COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 492-93; Sag, supra note 11, at 412-14 (providing
a brief history of fair use).
77. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 11, at 386.
78. See, e.g., Loren, supra note 50, at 4-5; Pasquale, supra note 39, at 84-85, 129-34.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 175-177.
80. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 3, at 213.
81. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 292, 304-05.
82. Id. at 95-99, 187; cf SHULMAN, supra note 33, at 55 (noting that most find it
cheaper to pay royalties than to litigate an infringement suit involving a questionable pat-
ent).
83. WEIL, supra note 41, at 530. While it is formally correct that "courts, not publishers,
adjudicate fair use," THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE 135 (15th ed. 2003), many defendants
cannot afford a court's adjudication due to the expenses of litigation.
SPRING 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Even the constricted view of fair use proposed by law and eco-
nomics theorists suffers from the problem of litigation costs.
According to law and economics theory, fair uses primarily exist
where the transaction costs of obtaining a license exceed the bene-
fits of the copyright users' use of the copyrighted material.84 Thus,
these commentators propose that copyright users bargain with
copyright holders. However, the threat of expensive litigation
places copyright holders in a position to dictate the terms of virtu-
815ally any license bargain. Further, some copyright holders have an
economic incentive to sue over effective parody or criticism, both
likely fair uses, in order to avoid the potential blow to the value of
their work.86 Moreover, if the copyright holder only wants to limit
criticism of the work (and not simply maximize short-term wealth
by collecting licensing fees), the copyright holder could seek per-
mission fees that most potential users would be unable or unwilling
81to pay, prohibiting copyright users from benefiting from this al-
ternative to costly litigation.
Large copyright holders (plaintiffs) are taking advantage of the
high costs of fair use litigation by engaging in "opportunistic
suits '88 and "[r] eckless 'intellectual property' intimidation."8 9 While
lawsuits are expensive for the plaintiffs, their potential benefits of-
ten outweigh their costs. Large copyright plaintiffs are repeat
litigators who can develop a reputation of creating expensive litiga-
tion for defendants. The costs of initially establishing this
84. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 115-23; Loren, supra note 50, at 25-
27.
85. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 51-52 (recounting the story of a student sued by the
Recording Industry Association of America). This situation represents a bilateral monopoly.
Assuming that no ready substitutes exist, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 39, the
copyright user can only turn to the copyright holder and only the copyright holder can
grant a license or refrain from suing.
86. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994) (noting that
such damages are non-compensable); see also LAWRENCE LEsSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE 134 (1999).
87. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright
and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CH. L. REV. 1009, 1042-43 (1990). Limiting criti-
cism was arguably the plaintiff's purpose in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d
1257, 1263-65 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing a preliminary injunction issued against the publi-
cation of Alice Randall's book The Wind Done Gone, a parody of Margaret Mitchell's Gone with
the Wind, and noting that fair use exists, in part, to preserve free speech rights).
88. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Prop-
erty Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REv. 509, 516-19 (2003) (providing examples).
89. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at 186-87. While anticompetitive, the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, among other things, shields these suits from potential antitrust viola-




reputation could be recouped over the long term by deterring
other potential defendants from litigating fair use against them."
Even if the litigation costs of fair use suits were reasonable, the
fact-sensitive nature of the fair use inquiry and the malleability of
the fair use factors means that the outcomes of litigation are un-
predictable. 9' The uncertainty of litigation forces defendants to
discount any expected gains from a fair use defense, effectively in-
creasing the amount of benefit required for the pursuit of such a
defense to be rational. As a result, fewer meritorious fair use de-
fenses can be profitably brought.
Current judicial application of the fair use doctrine contributes
to defendants' uncertainty. Many judges view fair use defenses with
suspicion because they perceive them to be an argument of last
resort, argued only in otherwise losing cases.92 Moreover, many
commentators suggest that the malleability of factors used in de-
termining the applicability of fair use lets judges perform their
analysis in an outcome-determinative manner.9'
Attendant to the uncertainty of winning a fair use defense are
the potential risks of losing. A losing defendant could face a large
damage award for copyright infringement. If many infringements
are asserted, the statutory damages provided by the Copyright Act
could make the costs of infringement astronomical. The potential
size of damage awards could greatly affect a defendant's risk-
assessment of litigation. Other risks of litigation include the poten-
tial for preliminary injunctions, loss of customers, and harm to the
90. See Meurer, supra note 88, at 515-16 (noting that this behavior would be rational);
see generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REV. 95, 98-103 (1974) (describing the advantages of repeat litiga-
tors). This strategy may not be expensive for plaintiffs because the threat of litigation may be
sufficient to alter the defendant's behavior.
91. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994). Also associated
with this uncertainty is the prospect of an appeal of the district court's fair use determina-
tion. In the three most recent Supreme Court cases discussing fair use, the court of appeals
reversed the district court and, in turn, the court of appeals was reversed by the Supreme
Court. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.05, at 13-156 (noting that the "malleability
of fair use emerges starkly" through this fact).
92. See Loren, supra note 50, at 57.
93. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 11, at 386; see also David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and
Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003) (concluding that
"[b]asically, had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use
factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the same.").
94. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 185, 192. Statutory damages are provided in 17 U.S.C.
§ 504 (2006). A fair use defendant's infringement might be deemed willful, leading to en-
hanced damages and attorney's fees. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document
Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 911-13 (E.D. Mich. 1994), vacated in part, 99 E3d 1381, 1393
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (vacating the willfulness finding after extended litigation); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1543-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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defendant's credit rating. As a result of the costs, uncertainty, and
risks of asserting a fair use defense, defendants have great incen-
tives to avoid fair use litigation and settle potential claims.
Due to these effective limits on the types of defendants that can
rationally afford to assert a fair use defense, some scholars suggest
that, ironically, the doctrine of fair use is being construed in an
increasingly anti-defendant manners because most current fair use
defendants are commercial organizations who stand to profit from
the asserted fair use.96 Judges have generally refrained from deem-
ing defendants' use of the doctrine for competitive advantage
"fair."97 While these defendants may, at times, assert the most ques-
tionable claims of fair use, the results of their litigation create
precedent that narrowly interprets fair use for all potential defen-
dants.
Many copyright users avoid relying on fair use because of the
risks inherent in fair use litigation. 98 Thus, fair use is unable to
serve its role of preserving the balance between the rights of copy-
right holders and copyright users. "The fuzzy lines of the law, tied
to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means that the
effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law has
the right aim; practice has defeated the aim."" Notably, this failure
is not because the doctrine of fair use is inherently ill-suited to bal-
ancing the rights of copyright holders and users, but rather
because of the practical difficulties of actually staging a fair use de-
fense. However, the current implementation of fair use, with its
attendant problems, is not supposed to occur. Section 505 of the
Copyright Act is meant to discourage weak, opportunistic suits by
permitting a discretionary award of attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in litigation.100 If properly implemented, awarding attorney's
95. Meurer, supra note 88, at 524.
96. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 3, at 212.
97. The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994), sought to correct this by making it clear that commercial uses can still be fair. Id. at
583-85. However, courts continue to place the most emphasis on potential harm to the
plaintiff's market. Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, and Copyright Comic Books:
The Fourth Fair Use Factor in U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REv. 665, 728-29 n.360
(2004) (compiling cases); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, at 4 ("Mostly, though, copyright
is about money."); Loren, supra note 50, at 27-30.
98. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 1, at 95-99 (recounting a documentary filmmaker's ef-
forts to obtain a license for an obviously fair use and eventual decision to delete the fair use
material). Similarly, computing policies at universities "overwhelmingly opt[] ... to disre-
gard these nuances and complexities" and refrain from allowing the arguably fair use of
computer software. CREWS, supra note 48, at 110.
99. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 99; accord CREws, supra note 48, at 131 ("The flexibility
Congress sought to preserve was lost.").
100. See infra text accompanying notes 122-126.
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fees could restore the balance of owners' and users' rights in fair
use litigation by increasing plaintiffs' expected costs and lowering
defendants' in a large number of fair use cases. However, as the
next Part demonstrates, § 505 suffers from its own implementation
problems-especially in the context of fair use.
III. THE INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF § 505 AND
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
Section 505 of the Copyright Act authorizes a discretionary
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party: "In any civil action
under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of
full costs by or against any party .... [T] he court may also award a
reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs."'0° The Act adopts a flexible rule that enables judges to award
attorney's fees in a way that, if properly and consistently imple-
mented, has the potential to promote progress. Prior to 1994,
lower courts interpreted § 505 in two different ways.' °2 The Su-
preme Court's decision in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. resolved this split
and mandated evenhanded treatment of plaintiffs and defen-
dants.' 3 But despite the Fogerty decision, fee awards remain skewed
toward plaintiffs, especially in fair use litigation.0 4 As a result of
Fogerty's subsequent misapplication, § 505 fails to discourage op-
portunistic lawsuits that threaten fair use.
Section 505 of the Copyright Act rejects both of the two major
fee shifting paradigms: the traditional American rule ("pay your
own way") and the British rule ("loser pays"). The American "sys-
tem does not regard bringing (or, for that matter, defending) a
losing case-without more-as the infliction of a legal wrong.'"5 A
pure American rule does not discourage plaintiffs from bringing
opportunistic lawsuits that are not technically frivolous because the
plaintiff only stands to pay its own attorney's fees." As Part II
101. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). Timely copyright registration is a prerequisite for an award
of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff under § 505. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006). Section 412
does not apply to copyright defendants. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 14.10[A], at
174 n.3.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 113-121.
103. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 127-147.
105. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 659. Of course, bringing a frivolous suit can constitute a legal wrong
under this system. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
106. See Rowe, supra note 105, at 659.
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discussed, copyright plaintiffs can afford to pay their own attor-
ney's fees to gain the reputational and other benefits of
opportunistic litigation. °7 Further, a pure American rule does not
encourage the maintenance of fair use defenses because the public
domain represents a public good. 1 8 By forcing each side to pay its
own way, it fails to encourage the vindication of rights in cases
where "the benefits of litigating far outweigh the costs but where
litigation is still unattractive because the benefits take the form of a
public good."' 09 Accordingly, a pure American rule would inade-
quately protect fair use.
The British rule is "general indemnification," meaning that the
prevailing party recovers its costs from the losing party in addition
to any other relief based on the substantive merits. ° Because this
rule is thought to reduce litigation by making it more risky and,
thus, simultaneously encourage settlements, there have been nu-
merous efforts to implement it in America." In the fair use
context, this rule would discourage litigation because the outcomes
of fair use cases are often uncertain, and while both plaintiff and
defendant would bear an increased risk in litigating, the more risk-
averse party (usually the party with less money, in this case the
defendant) has a larger incentive to avoid litigation.1 1 2 Because
copyright plaintiffs already frequently litigate copyright claims
despite the costs, the British rule would discourage meritorious fair
use defenses. Thus both the British and the American rules pro-
vide an unattractive canon of attorney fee allocation.
The Copyright Act creates a hybrid of the American and British
fee shifting rules by authorizing a discretionary award of fees to the
prevailing party. 13 This hybrid rule allows judges the flexibility to
fee shift in cases where doing so would support the policy of pro-
moting progress that underlies copyright law. 4 Prior to Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., there were two interpretations of the Copyright Act's
fee shifting provision: the "dual" standard and the "evenhanded"
107. See supra text accompanying notes 81-95.
108. Recall that few copyright users garner significant monetary value from the public
domain. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47. In such situations the defendant's poten-
tial attorney's fees may easily exceed the costs of litigation. See Rowe, supra note 105, at 662;
see also supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
109. Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation:
The Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYUJ. PuB. L. 317, 327-28 (2005).
110. Rowe, supra note 105, at 651, 654-55.
111. Edward E Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer ofJudgment Rules: Reconciling
Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1863, 1866-68 (1998).
112. Id. at 1871.
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006); see generally Rowe, supra note 105, at 670-71 (discussing
the advantages ofjudicial discretion to fee shift).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 122-126.
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standard."' Each interpretation was based on a different view of
the purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause.'
Fogerty reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that utilized a "dual"
standard for attorney's fees." 7 Under the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion, a "prevailing defendant [could] not be awarded attorneys'
fees under § 505 unless it can be demonstrated that the action was
frivolous or was instituted and prosecuted in bad faith."" s Plaintiffs
did not need to show frivolity or bad faith and, as a result, were
frequently awarded fees."9 The justification for the dual standard
was that it "avoid[ed] chilling a copyright holder's incentive to sue
on colorable claims."''20 Thus, the dual standard assumed that the
protection of copyright holders' rights was the central goal of
copyright law.
Other circuits used an "evenhanded" approach that did not dif-
ferentiate between plaintiffs and defendants in determining awards
of attorney's fees. 2' The courts implementing this system recog-
nized that copyright plaintiffs and defendants play equally
important roles in arriving at the proper balance of public and pri-
vate rights that best promotes progress.
In resolving the circuit split, the Fogerty Court rejected the Ninth
Circuit's dual standard and adopted the evenhanded approach to
awarding attorney's fees. 2 2 The Court reasoned:
[C]opyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching
the general public through access to creative works .... To
that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of merito-
rious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate
them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to liti-
gate meritorious claims of infringement.... Thus a successful
defense of a copyright infringement action may further the
policies of the Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful
115. See infra text accompanying notes 117-121.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 120-124.
117. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 521 (1994).
118. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1532 (9th Cir. 1993). The Second, Seventh,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits used the dual standard. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 521 n.8.
119. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 520-21.
120. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1532.
121. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 521. The Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits used the even-
handed approach. Id. at 521 n.8. The terms "dual" and "evenhanded" are only descriptors
and are not meant to pass judgment on the inherent fairness of either method. Id. at 521
n.7.
122. Id. at 521.
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Thus, the Supreme Court adopted an interpretation of § 505 that
favored the constitutional purpose of copyright law over an inter-
pretation that primarily protected copyright holders.1
24
Because the text of § 505 provides no guidance to the courts as
to the specific circumstances when they should award fees to the
prevailing party, the Court, in dicta in a footnote, quoted a nonex-
clusive list of factors set forth by the Third Circuit in Lieb v. Topstone
Industries, Inc.: a court should award fees when the "frivolousness,
motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in
the legal components of the case) and the need in particular cir-
cumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence" 125 make such an award to the prevailing party appro-
priate. While the Lieb factors are a useful guide, courts do not have
to apply this nonexclusive list mechanically. Courts and commenta-
tors have suggested that Fogerty stands for the proposition that
"[f] aithfulness to the purposes of the Copyright Act is ... the piv-
126otal criterion" in determining if an award of fees is appropriate.
Despite the Fogerty decision, the discretionary award of attorney's
fees is still not "evenhanded" in many courts. 27 For the purposes of
this Part, the lack of an evenhanded approach means that many
judges systematically award attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs
more often than to prevailing defendants who brought equally
meritorious arguments. "Evenhandedness" applies both in the lar-
ger context of the copyright act and in the specific context of fair
use.
Post-Fogerty, some district courts have expressly endorsed reason-
ing rejected by Fogerty by applying the dual standard that Fogerty
123. Id. at 527.
124. See id. at 526.
125. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 E2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986), quoted in Fogerty, 510
U.S. at 534 n.19. Depending on the situation, these factors, or others, should be accorded
varying weights. See Lieb, 788 F.2d at 156.
126. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming an award of fees
to the defendant); accord Palladium Music, Inc. v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1200-
01 (10th Cir. 2005); Douglas Y'Barbo, The Effect ofFogerty v. Fantasy on the Award of Attorney's
Fees in Copyright Disputes, 5 TEx. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 231, 237 (1997) ("Therefore, I read Fogerty
to stand for the proposition that any construction of section 505 that results in even-handed
treatment and that does not divest the trial court of its ability to exercise equitable discre-
tion is permissible.").
127. See infra text accompanying notes 128-152.
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rejected.'28 For example, language stating that plaintiffs are entitled
to more generous treatment than defendants can still be found in
district court decisions.'2 Even if courts do not expressly endorse
the dual standard, it appears that many are applying it nonetheless.
Studies suggest that prevailing plaintiffs still receive fee awards
more often than prevailing defendants. "'0
The failure of courts to apply the evenhanded approach dictated
by Fogerty is notable in fair use cases. For example, in Belmore v. City
Pages, Inc., the court declined to award fees to a defendant who
prevailed with a fair use argument at the stage of summary judg-
ment.13' The court reasoned that fair use only arises after the
plaintiff has demonstrated ownership of a valid copyright and ac-
tionable copying by the defendant, so the plaintiff set forth a
reasonable claim. 132 According to this reasoning, it would be impos-
sible for any defendant who relies on a fair use defense to obtain
an award of attorney's fees. Indeed, in a throwback to the dual
standard, the court suggested that the only way it would allow a
prevailing fair use defendant to receive an award of fees was if the
defendant proved that the action was "frivolous or was commenced
in bad faith."'3' This decision ignores the fact that the availability of
128. See Robert Aloysius Hyde & Lisa M. Sharrock, A Decade Down the Road But Still Run-
ning Through the Jungle: A Critical Review of Post-Fogerty Fee Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 467,
474-75 (2004).
129. See, e.g., Great Importations, Inc. v. Caffco Int'l, Inc., No. 95Civ.0514, 1997 WL
603410, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1997); Walden Music, Inc. v. C.H.W., Inc., No. 95-4023-
SAC, 1996 WL 254654, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr. 19, 1996); Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877
F. Supp. 830, 844 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Hyde & Sharrock, supra note 128, at 474 n.56
(listing other examples).
130. See, e.g., Jeffrey Edward Barnes, Comment, Attorney's Fee Awards in Federal Copyright
Litigation After Fogerty v. Fantasy: Defendants are Winning Fees More Often, But the New Standard
Still Favors Prevailing Plaintiffs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1381, 1390 (2000); YBarbo, supra note 126,
at 238-39 (showing that, while prevailing plaintiffs still receive fees more often than prevail-
ing defendants, this gap has grown smaller). Of course, a higher rate of fee awards to
plaintiffs does not ineluctably equate to a pro-plaintiff bias. See Hyde & Sharrock, supra note
128, at 474. However, given the structural disincentives that already discourage many fair use
defenses, it is more likely in this context that this demonstrates a pro-plaintiff bias.
131. Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Stipp. 673, 680-81 (D. Minn. 1995).
132. Belmore, 880 F. Supp. at 680-81.
133. Id.; accord Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1156-57
(9th Cir. 1986) (denying fees to a prevailing fair use defendant because the plaintiffs argu-
ments were not frivolous) (pre-Fogerty); Baraban v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 99Civ.1569(JSM),
2000 WL 358375, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying attorney's fees to a prevailing fair use de-
fendant because there was "no evidence of bad faith"). But see Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v.
Cable News Network, Inc., Nos. 98 Civ. 7128(BSJ), 7129(BSJ), 7130(BSJ), 2003 WL 1701904,
at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003) (awarding fees to a fair use defendant to deter future objec-
tively unreasonable suits meant to "chill other fair uses").
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fair use as a defense affects a plaintiffs ability to bring a meritori-
134ous case.
Some courts treat a plaintiff's fee petition favorably because the
defendant lost its fair use defense. The courts explain that fair use
is not novel because it has a long common law history and that this
history justifies the imposition of fees on a losing fair use defen-
dant. 35 This reasoning erroneously assumes that the doctrine has
crystallized over time into a bright-line set of rules that a defendant
could readily follow, and that a non-fair use is relatively obvious.
This assumption also causes courts to ignore one of Fogerty's central
premises: courts should be cautious about awarding fees when the
relevant boundaries of copyright law are unclear, 36 such as in fair
use cases. 31 "Almost every comment on the subject notes that fair
use is 'one of the most troublesome [doctrines] in the whole law of
copyright.' ,131
Other courts consider the ultimate damages award when decid-
ing whether to award fees to a prevailing plaintiff. For example,
when a plaintiff prevails, the Seventh Circuit focuses on "the
strength of the prevailing party's case and the amount of damages
or other relief the party obtained. If the case was a toss-up and the
prevailing party obtained generous damages... there is no urgent
need to add an award of attorneys' fees.'' 139 This standard practi-
cally guarantees a prevailing plaintiff sufficient remuneration. If
the plaintiff received large damages, a fee award, while possibly
justified according to the standards guiding judicial discretion, is
not needed to give the plaintiff a sufficient incentive to bring a
suit.140 If the plaintiff did not receive large damages-a sign that
the plaintiffs case was probably weak-a fee award is more likely.1
4'
In the case of a prevailing defendant, the Seventh Circuit states
134. The exclusive rights granted to holders of a copyright are expressly limited by fair
use, among other statutory limitations. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-122 (2006); see also Encyclope-
dia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 249 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
135. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1547 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (pre-Fogerty). But see Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 E Supp.
1156, 1186-87 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (denying fees to a prevailing fair use plaintiff because the
case was complex and the defendant capably argued its fair use claim).
136. SeeFogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
137. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
138. Sag, supra note 11, at 385 (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 E2d 661,
662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam)).
139. Assessment Techs. v. Wiredata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2004).
140. See generally Rowe, supra note 105, at 667-68 (arguing that two-way fee shifting
normally requires an incentives-based justification).
141. See Hyde & Sharrock, supra note 128, at 476-77. The assessment of statutory dam-
ages can range from a few hundred dollars per infringement to over a hundred thousand
dollars per infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
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that fees are in order "if ... the claim or defense was frivolous and
the prevailing party obtained no relief at all."42 Under this stan-
dard, a successful defendant only receives fees if it can prove the
plaintiff's suit was frivolous.
Courts use the availability of a licensing market to support fee
awards to prevailing plaintiffs and to deny fee awards to prevailing
defendants. 143 However, the presence of a licensing market has lit-
tle direct bearing on a fair use claim. 44 The purpose of the fair use
analysis is to determine if a copyright holder is entitled to demand
licensing fees. The plaintiff's willingness to offer a license does not
solve the initial question of whether or not the defendant needs a
license.1 45 This licensing problem has been exacerbated by the dis-
tribution of copyrighted content on the Internet, because the
Internet greatly reduces transaction costs that would be otherwise
associated with obtaining licenses.
4 6
In sharp contrast to the lax standards sometimes applied when
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs, defendants who
prevail on a fair use defense often have a more difficult time ob-
taining an award. Prevailing defendants encounter difficulties
when they profit from legal behavior that, on first glance, appears
questionable. Under such circumstances, some courts suggest that
the defendant has already profited from its business activities and,
thus, does not need a fee award as well.14 7 While refraining from
awarding fees would encourage both parties to litigate borderline
issues, many judges are suspicious of fair use and, thus, view it as a
142. Assessment Techs., 361 F.3d at 436. For further discussion of this issue, see Hyde &
Sharrock, supra note 128, at 475-79.
143. See, e.g., Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Nos. 98 Civ. 7128(BSJ),
7129(BSJ), 7130(BSJ), 2003 WL 1701904, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003) (considering the
possibility of licensing but ultimately awarding fees to the prevailing defendant); Marshall &
Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952,964 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (finding it probative that a
defendant considered entering a licensing agreement); cf Grand Upright Music Ltd. v.
Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The publishers in the
Google Book Search litigation use the potential of a licensing market as an argument
against Google's use being fair. See Allan Adler, Vice President for Legal and Governmental
Affairs at the American Association of Publishers, Remarks at the New York Public Library
Forum, supra note 7, at 5.
144. Loren, supra note 50, at 38-48.
145. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1407-09 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (Ryan,J., dissenting). This argument has received a mixed reception in the
courts. It is clear at least that a defendant's failed attempt at obtaining a license plays no role
in the fair use calculus. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mtsic, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18
(1994).
146. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, at 202-03, 207-08.
147. See, e.g., FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., I F. Supp. 2d 859, 867 (N.D. I11. 1998)
(explaining that the defendant was close to copyright infringement and, thus, should not
receive fees).
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defense raised only as a last resort in borderline cases.148 As a result,
the defendant must substantially profit from the fair use in order
to rationally bring a fair use defense because the expected value of
the suit must exceed the expected costs. However, courts use the
fact that the defendant profited from a fair use to suggest that the
defendant should be denied attorney's fees as an additional bene-
fit. Thus, § 505 does little to encourage the assertion of fair use
defenses.
Because of the varying applications of Fogerty, there is little pre-
dictability in the current application of § 505. 49 This uncertainty of
outcomes creates a disincentive for parties to litigate copyright
cases by increasing the risks associated with bringing or defending
a suit. However, because repeat copyright plaintiffs can afford to
take more risks,5 0 defendants are disproportionately impacted. The
Supreme Court has compounded the problem by providing little
guidance on the proper implementation of Fogerty.'5" Ad hoc deci-
sions by a trial court are necessarily "inconsistent with the mandate
of even-handed treatment."
5 2
Given this unbalanced treatment of plaintiffs and defendants in
fair use litigation, the present implementation of Fogerty not only
fails to deter overreaching plaintiffs, but even encourages plaintiffs
to litigate because defendants now bear greater risks in litigation.
To both overcome this problem and to provide parties with better
guidance regarding § 505, Part IV proposes an interpretation of
Fogerty that should be utilized in the context of fair use defenses.
148. See supra text accompanying note 92.
149. Y'Barbo, supra note 126, at 251. While Y'Barbo only discusses the effect the uncer-
tain application of§ 505 has on plaintiffs, the same uncertainties exist for defendants.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
151. For example, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases where the peti-
tioner sought clarification of § 505 and Fogerty. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, GMA
Accessories, Inc. v. Olivia Miller, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1342 (2006) (No. 05-794), 2005 WL
3514333; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Keane v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 426
(2005) (No. 05-202), 2005 WL 1921955; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dan Chase Taxi-
dermy Supply Co. v. Superior Form Builders, Inc., 519 U.S. 809 (1996) (No. 95-1765), 1996
WL 33439742; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Subafilms, Ltd. v. United Artists Corp., 513
U.S. 1001 (1994) (No. 94-546), 1994 WL 16042807.
152. Y'Barbo, supra note 126, at 248. Practitioners have voiced their frustration over fee
shifting in the past. Letter from George E. Frost (Oct. 17, 1956), in Comments and Views Sub-
mitted to the Copyright Office on the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, supra note 32, at Study No. 22, ix, 37 ("My point is, however, that the law in its
present form flips and flops and winds all about itself in a hopeless hodgepodge because of




IV. REVITALIZING Fogerty TO PROTECT FAIR USE CLAIMS
The failure of Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. does not lie in the decision
itself, but only in its later implementation. This implementation
undermines the Supreme Court's goal of encouraging copyright
users (defendants) to vigorously litigate.1 53 Accordingly, the imple-
mentation of Fogerty in fair use cases is in need of reform. Any
modification of the implementation must at least restore even-
handedness in the § 505 standards applied to plaintiffs and
defendants.
However, even courts that scrupulously adhere to Fogerty assume
a single interpretation of the Court's command of evenhanded-
ness. Under the extant interpretation, evenhanded treatment
occurs when the same standard is used to assess the fee petitions of
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants. However, the mandate of
evenhandedness can also be interpreted more generally to mean
that an "evenhanded" approach equalizes litigation incentives be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants. While the Court's decision in
Fogerty did not expressly endorse either interpretation of even-
handedness, this Part contends that an interpretation of
evenhanded focused on equalizing plaintiff and defendant incen-
tives to litigate best meets Fogerty's rationale and the purpose of the
Intellectual Property Clause.
An evenhanded standard that balances incentives to litigate
would have two components. First, the relative financial strengths
of the parties should be considered. If the losing party is not
deemed capable of paying the fee award, it should not be awarded
except if current Lieb factors are met.154 This factor serves as a
proxy for the imbalanced litigation incentives that may be present
in the given case. 15 5 Second, if the losing party is deemed capable of
153. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (stating that defendants "should
be encouraged to litigate ... to the same extent" as plaintiffs "[b]ecause copyright law ulti-
mately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative
works");Jaszi, supra note 19, at 122 ("The array of factors considered in section 505 must be
explicitly supplemented to take account of the important public purpose served by the vig-
orous defense of copyright cases.").
154. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 E2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986). Taking the financial
strength of the parties into account lets small plaintiffs bring colorable actions against large
defendants. Such a standard is in keeping with the goal of encouraging litigation on the
merits in order to further the purposes of copyright law. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527. Imple-
menting fee shifting to better match party resources in litigation has been done in other
contexts. See Rowe, supra note 105, at 663-64.
155. Indeed, the examples discussing reckless intellectual property litigation by plain-
tiffs, see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 81-90, all assume a plaintiff that is significantly
wealthier than the defendant. While the public goods problem is always present on the
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paying the fee award, a new dual standard should be applied. Un-
der this standard, a prevailing fair use defendant should be
required to show objective unreasonableness in order to secure
fees. However, a prevailing plaintiff should be required to show a
frivolous and bad faith defense in order to recover attorney's fees
related to the fair use defense.
For a number of reasons, this standard should be limited only to
fair use, and should not be applied throughout all copyright litiga-
tion. First, unlike most other aspects of the Copyright Act, fair use
is primarily a judicial doctrine. 56 Thus, it uniquely requires a sys-
tem that encourages both defendants and plaintiffs to equally
litigate. Second, the doctrine of fair use contributes to a great deal
of uncertainty in copyright law. This uncertainty can only be re-
solved through litigation. Finally, fair use plays a unique role in
protecting the public domain. Given the process-based imbalances
that are constricting the public domain, a countervailing weight is
needed to effect a rebalancing.
The proposed standard best upholds the Court's rationale in
Fogerty. The Fogerty Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's dual standard
not because it applied different rules for recovery to plaintiffs and
defendants, but because it elevated the grants of limited monopo-
lies to authors over copyright's goal of promoting progress. 57 The
poor implementation of Fogerty discussed in Part III of this Note
fails to uphold this balance between the means and ends by creat-
ing a disincentive for fair use defendants to vigorously litigate.
Moreover, even an implementation of the same § 505 standard for
plaintiffs and defendants would not equalize their relative incen-
tives to litigate due to the inherent process-based imbalances in the
status quo.'5s In order to restore this balance, defendants must have
a greater chance at an award of fees than plaintiffs.
A standard that equalizes incentives to litigate is faithful to the
fee shifting factors endorsed by Fogerty.'59 The last consideration
mentioned by the Court, "the need in particular circumstances to
advance considerations of compensation and deterrence,' 60 pro-
vides a license for flexibility in awards of fees. Given the process-
based imbalances that create different incentives for litigation,
defense side, the imbalanced litigation incentives become more pronounced as plaintiffs
become wealthier than defendants.
156. Congress has done little more than codify the common law doctrine of fair use and
has expressly stated its intent that fair use should remain a judicial doctrine. See supra text
accompanying notes 15 and 75.
157. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526-27.
158. See supra Part I.
159. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 535 n.19 (1994).
160. Id. (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3rd Cir. 1986)).
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there is a need to deter plaintiff suits that are excessive relative to a
defendant's ability to defend.
While some courts have rejected a standard that almost always
compels fee shifting,"" their reasoning is unfounded. In context,
the Fogerty decision emphasized judicial discretion in the award of
fees as a reason for rejecting the petitioner's argument that § 505
adopted the British rule of fee shifting.' 62 While trial court discre-
tion is needed as a general principle, it is logical to believe that the
Fogerty Court sought to encourage the lower courts to treat similar
cases in a similar manner.16 Given the balance of the equities in the
types of fair use cases to which the proposed dual standard applies,
it is sensible that prevailing defendants should receive an award of
fees in many cases.
A modified system for awarding fees will likely have a positive
behavioral effect on litigation by preventing plaintiff overreaching.
Economically, "[fWee shifting deters opportunistic suits by raising
the expected cost of weak lawsuits and undermining the credibility
of the plaintiffs threat to go to trial." 164 A plaintiff's reduced likeli-
hood of recouping attorney's fees heightens the expected cost of
litigation, which encourages parties to settle before trial by reduc-
ing the expected returns from a successful lawsuit. 16 However, the
proposed dual standard still is cabined because it would only have
a deterrent effect in cases where the plaintiffs claim was of ques-
tionable merit. If the plaintiff has a strong chance of winning, the
plaintiff would not have to fear paying attorney's fees to the defen-
dant. Thus, the proposed solution would have no effect on strong
claims, but would cause plaintiffs to reconsider their options be-
fore proceeding with weak claims. Most importantly, it would
discourage plaintiffs from engaging in reckless intellectual prop-
erty litigation.
A modified system for awarding fees would also expand the
scope of the public domain by forcing plaintiffs to bring only valu-
able, meritorious claims. By limiting a plaintiffs ability to recover
fees, the expected monetary value of a plaintiffs claim is reduced.
Accordingly, plaintiffs are effectively prevented from bringing
161. See, e.g., Great Importations, Inc. v. Caffco Int'l, Inc., No. 95Civ.0514(MBM)(SEG),
1997 WL 603410, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 30, 1997).
162. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 533-34.
163. Apart from seeming obvious, the Court's endorsement of the Lieb factors, see id. at
534 n.19, suggests that it was trying to provide lower courts with a uniform analytical starting
point.
164. Meurer, supra note 88, at 537.
165. Douglas YBarbo, On Fee Shifting and the Protection of Copyright, 44 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'v U.S.A. 23, 24 (1996).
SPRING 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
copyright infringement claims when the infringement damages are
nominal,' 6 which would also increase the costs of any plaintiffs
seeking to acquire a reputation of vigorously litigating fair use
cases.
The process-based disincentives for defendants to bring fair use
defenses further justify this dual standard. Despite the longstand-
ing nature of the fair use defense, 67 it is still complex and, because
of the fact-bound nature of the analysis, novel. 68 Due to its com-
plexity, it is very difficult for defendants to know if a claim is likely
to lose. Thus, imposing a heightened standard for plaintiffs' recov-
ery of fees protects defendants. 169 Similarly, this fee shifting model
would reduce the public goods problem by increasing the chances
of a defendant being fully compensated. 7 ° A lower standard for
awarding fees to a prevailing defendant is similarly appropriate be-
cause the uncertainty of fair use naturally encourages defendants
to settle cases despite their merits. Thus, a more lenient standard
for defendants serves as a form of compensation to encourage de-
fendants to litigate as vigorously as plaintiffs.'
7
1
By equalizing the incentives for both plaintiffs and defendants to
litigate meritorious claims, the constitutional function of copyright
law-promoting progress-will be enhanced regardless of the re-
sults of any subsequent litigation because the presence of
defendants willing to assert fair use claims will, at the very least,
spur copyright owners into increasing public access to protected
166. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit presently seeks to encourage such claims by award-
ing fees to plaintiffs because damages were nominal. See Gonzalez v. Transfer Techs., Inc., 301
F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting a "presumptive entitlement" of fees for a prevailing
plaintiff in such cases). This ignores that a range statutory damages are generally available.
Thus, a small award of damages is likely indicative of a marginal claim. See supra text accom-
panying notes 139-142.
167. See supra text accompanying note 76.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. The unpredictability of fair use has long
been recognized. See, e.g., RiCHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW
253-54 (1912) ("The borderland between infringement and 'fair use' is peculiarly and nec-
essarily one of uncertainty, not so much because of ambiguity in the statute as of difficulty in
determining the extent of use within which it is said non curat lex. No statute can be so clear
or so complete as to obviate questions of this kind."); Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works, in COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, supra note 32, at Study No. 14, 1, 14.
169. Cf Applied Innovations, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 876 F.2d 626, 638
(8th Cir. 1989) (applying similar reasoning in affirming a denial of fees to a prevailing plain-
tiff).
170. In the context of patent infringement litigation, various versions of bounties for
prevailing defendants have been proposed as means of overcoming a similar public goods
problem. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 42, at 704-05. These proposals rely on mechanisms
other than patent law's fee shifting statute. As such, they likely require statutory implemen-
tation.
171. See Barnes, supra note 130, at 1404.
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works. 72 Thus, the mere potential for a challenge to a copyright




Benjamin Cardozo stated that "the sordid controversies of liti-
gants are the stuff out of which great and shining truths will
ultimately be shaped.' 74 However, the current state of copyright
law contains a long chain of imbalances that have created a system
where copyright holders are encouraged to take strategic advan-
tage of the weak positions of copyright users. As a result, many
"sordid controversies" are not litigated because copyright users
cannot afford to maintain meritorious defenses. The public do-
main is consequently constricted, fair use nullified, and the
constitutional purpose of copyright law obscured.
Inherent process-based imbalances have created substantive im-
balances that appear both in litigation and legislation. These
imbalances both attack fair use and force the public domain to in-
creasingly rely on fair use for its defense. While fair use might be
up to the task, its current implementation effectively prevents
many defendants from relying on it. Although § 505 and the Fogerty
decision were intended to prevent an imbalance of rights, both
§ 505 and Fogerty have been improperly implemented by the courts,
exacerbating the inadequate implementation of fair use.
Loosening the constraints on fair use could, with time and litiga-
tion, rebalance copyright law. Many scholars have suggested ways to
apply fair use to restore the public domain. Some have proffered
interpretations of fair use that reflect the non-monetary, abstract
benefits it was intended to protect in an effort to solve the public
172. See, e.g., Online Books: Pulp Friction, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 63, 64 ("Publishers
admit that the entry of Google and other tech firms has galvanised them to pay attention to
digitisation. 'The fact is that Google's and Amazon's actions have stimulated the energy for
this to take off,' says Ian Hudson, group managing director of Random House in London.
'Otherwise we would have dragged on for ages working it out.'"). In part, such actions are a
natural response to plaintiffs seeking to undermine a claim of fair use. By creating a market
for the same use as the defendants, plaintiffs are trying to tilt a factor in the fair use analysis
in their favor. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
173. Cf United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945)
("[The] possession of unchallenged power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and de-
presses energy; ... immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant[] to
industrial progress ... ").
174. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921).
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goods problem. Other proposals are a direct response to increas-
ing copyright durations and the stress that they place on the public
176domain. Ultimately, fair use might even be able to resolve other
problems of rightsholder expansion, such as the increasing reli-
ance on code and contract to create additional rights for content
owners. 7 7 However, none of these proposals will be effective until
defendants effectively assert fair use defenses. It is encouraging to
know that "U] udges are capable of learning '178 and that with suffi-
cient litigation, the fair use doctrine could both fulfill its intended
role and promote progress.
175. For a recent example, see generally Pasquale, supra note 39.
176. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal 101 MICH. L. REv. 409, 425-26 (2002).
177. See generally LESSIG, supra note 86, at 139.
178. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 3, at 213.
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